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Abstract
We analyze the type of learned optimization that occurs when a learned model
(such as a neural network) is itself an optimizer—a situation we refer to as
mesa-optimization, a neologism we introduce in this paper. We believe that the
possibility of mesa-optimization raises two important questions for the safety
and transparency of advanced machine learning systems. First, under what
circumstances will learned models be optimizers, including when they should
not be? Second, when a learned model is an optimizer, what will its objective
be—how will it differ from the loss function it was trained under—and how
can it be aligned? In this paper, we provide an in-depth analysis of these two
primary questions and provide an overview of topics for future research.
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1 Introduction
In machine learning, we do not manually program each individual parameter of our
models. Instead, we specify an objective function that captures what we want the
system to do and a learning algorithm to optimize the system for that objective. In
this paper, we present a framework that distinguishes what a system is optimized
to do (its “purpose”), from what it optimizes for (its “goal”), if it optimizes for
anything at all. While all AI systems are optimized for something (have a purpose),
whether they actually optimize for anything (pursue a goal) is non-trivial. We
will say that a system is an optimizer if it is internally searching through a search
space (consisting of possible outputs, policies, plans, strategies, or similar) looking
for those elements that score high according to some objective function that is
explicitly represented within the system. Learning algorithms in machine learning
are optimizers because they search through a space of possible parameters—e.g.
neural network weights—and improve the parameters with respect to some objective.
Planning algorithms are also optimizers, since they search through possible plans,
picking those that do well according to some objective.
Whether a system is an optimizer is a property of its internal structure—what
algorithm it is physically implementing—and not a property of its input-output
behavior. Importantly, the fact that a system’s behavior results in some objective
being maximized does not make the system an optimizer. For example, a bottle cap
causes water to be held inside the bottle, but it is not optimizing for that outcome
since it is not running any sort of optimization algorithm.[1] Rather, bottle caps
have been optimized to keep water in place. The optimizer in this situation is the
human that designed the bottle cap by searching through the space of possible tools
for one to successfully hold water in a bottle. Similarly, image-classifying neural
networks are optimized to achieve low error in their classifications, but are not, in
general, themselves performing optimization.
However, it is also possible for a neural network to itself run an optimization
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algorithm. For example, a neural network could run a planning algorithm that
predicts the outcomes of potential plans and searches for those it predicts will result
in some desired outcome.1 Such a neural network would itself be an optimizer
because it would be searching through the space of possible plans according to some
objective function. If such a neural network were produced in training, there would
be two optimizers: the learning algorithm that produced the neural network—which
we will call the base optimizer—and the neural network itself—which we will call
the mesa-optimizer.2
The possibility of mesa-optimizers has important implications for the safety
of advanced machine learning systems. When a base optimizer generates a mesa-
optimizer, safety properties of the base optimizer may not transfer to the mesa-
optimizer. Thus, we explore two primary questions related to the safety of mesa-
optimizers:
1. Mesa-optimization: Under what circumstances will learned algorithms be
optimizers?
2. Inner alignment: When a learned algorithm is an optimizer, what will its
objective be, and how can it be aligned?
Once we have introduced our framework in section 1, we will address the first
question in section 2, begin addressing the second question in section 3, and finally
delve deeper into a specific aspect of the second question in section 4.
1.1 Base optimizers and mesa-optimizers
Conventionally, the base optimizer in a machine learning setup is some sort of
gradient descent process with the goal of creating a model designed to accomplish
some specific task.
Sometimes, this process will also involve some degree of meta-optimization
wherein a meta-optimizer is tasked with producing a base optimizer that is itself
good at optimizing systems to achieve particular goals. Specifically, we will think
of a meta-optimizer as any system whose task is optimization. For example, we
might design a meta-learning system to help tune our gradient descent process.[4]
Though the model found by meta-optimization can be thought of as a kind of learned
1As a concrete example of what a neural network optimizer might look like, consider
TreeQN.[2] TreeQN, as described in Farquhar et al., is a Q-learning agent that performs
model-based planning (via tree search in a latent representation of the environment states)
as part of its computation of the Q-function. Though their agent is an optimizer by design,
one could imagine a similar algorithm being learned by a DQN agent with a sufficiently
expressive approximator for the Q function. Universal Planning Networks, as described by
Srinivas et al.,[3] provide another example of a learned system that performs optimization,
though the optimization there is built-in in the form of SGD via automatic differentiation.
However, research such as that in Andrychowicz et al.[4] and Duan et al.[5] demonstrate
that optimization algorithms can be learned by RNNs, making it possible that a Universal
Planning Networks-like agent could be entirely learned—assuming a very expressive model
space—including the internal optimization steps. Note that while these examples are taken
from reinforcement learning, optimization might in principle take place in any sufficiently
expressive learned system.
2Previous work in this space has often centered around the concept of “optimization
daemons,”[6] a framework that we believe is potentially misleading and hope to supplant.
Notably, the term “optimization daemon” came out of discussions regarding the nature of
humans and evolution, and, as a result, carries anthropomorphic connotations.
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optimizer, it is not the form of learned optimization that we are interested in for
this paper. Rather, we are concerned with a different form of learned optimization
which we call mesa-optimization.
Mesa-optimization is a conceptual dual of meta-optimization—whereas meta is
Greek for above, mesa is Greek for below.3 Mesa-optimization occurs when a base
optimizer (in searching for algorithms to solve some problem) finds a model that is
itself an optimizer, which we will call a mesa-optimizer. Unlike meta-optimization,
in which the task itself is optimization, mesa-optimization is task-independent, and
simply refers to any situation where the internal structure of the model ends up
performing optimization because it is instrumentally useful for solving the given
task.
In such a case, we will use base objective to refer to whatever criterion the base
optimizer was using to select between different possible systems and mesa-objective
to refer to whatever criterion the mesa-optimizer is using to select between different
possible outputs. In reinforcement learning (RL), for example, the base objective
is generally the expected return. Unlike the base objective, the mesa-objective is
not specified directly by the programmers. Rather, the mesa-objective is simply
whatever objective was found by the base optimizer that produced good performance
on the training environment. Because the mesa-objective is not specified by the
programmers, mesa-optimization opens up the possibility of a mismatch between the
base and mesa- objectives, wherein the mesa-objective might seem to perform well on
the training environment but lead to bad performance off the training environment.
We will refer to this case as pseudo-alignment below.
There need not always be a mesa-objective since the algorithm found by the base
optimizer will not always be performing optimization. Thus, in the general case,
we will refer to the model generated by the base optimizer as a learned algorithm,
which may or may not be a mesa-optimizer.
Figure 1: The relationship between the base and mesa- optimizers. The base optimizer
optimizes the learned algorithm based on its performance on the base objective. In order
to do so, the base optimizer may have turned this learned algorithm into a mesa-optimizer,
in which case the mesa-optimizer itself runs an optimization algorithm based on its own
mesa-objective. Regardless, it is the learned algorithm that directly takes actions based on
its input.
Possible misunderstanding: “mesa-optimizer” does not mean “subsys-
3The word mesa has been proposed as the opposite of meta.[7] The duality comes from
thinking of meta-optimization as one layer above the base optimizer and mesa-optimization
as one layer below.
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tem” or “subagent.” In the context of deep learning, a mesa-optimizer is simply a
neural network that is implementing some optimization process and not some emer-
gent subagent inside that neural network. Mesa-optimizers are simply a particular
type of algorithm that the base optimizer might find to solve its task. Furthermore,
we will generally be thinking of the base optimizer as a straightforward optimization
algorithm, and not as an intelligent agent choosing to create a subagent (though
some of our considerations apply even in that case).
We distinguish the mesa-objective from a related notion that we term the behav-
ioral objective. Informally, the behavioral objective is the objective which appears to
be optimized by the system’s behavior. More formally, we can operationalize the
behavioral objective as the objective recovered from perfect inverse reinforcement
learning (IRL).4 This is in contrast to the mesa-objective, which is the objective
actively being used by the mesa-optimizer in its optimization algorithm.
Arguably, any possible system has a behavioral objective—including bricks and
bottle caps. However, for non-optimizers, the appropriate behavioral objective might
just be “1 if the actions taken are those that are in fact taken by the system and 0
otherwise,”5 and it is thus neither interesting nor useful to know that the system is
acting to optimize this objective. For example, the behavioral objective “optimized”
by a bottle cap is the objective of behaving like a bottle cap.6 However, if the system
is an optimizer, then it is more likely that it will have a meaningful behavioral
objective. That is, to the degree that a mesa-optimizer’s output is systematically
selected to optimize its mesa-objective, its behavior may look more like coherent
attempts to move the world in a particular direction.7
A given mesa-optimizer’s mesa-objective is determined entirely by its internal
workings. Once training is finished and a learned algorithm is selected, its direct
output—e.g. the actions taken by an RL agent—no longer depends on the base
objective. Thus, it is the mesa-objective, not the base objective, that determines
a mesa-optimizer’s behavioral objective. Of course, to the degree that the learned
algorithm was selected on the basis of the base objective, its output will score well on
the base objective. However, in the case of a distributional shift, we should expect a
mesa-optimizer’s behavior to more robustly optimize for the mesa-objective since its
behavior is directly computed according to it.
As an example to illustrate the base/mesa distinction in a different domain, and
the possibility of misalignment between the base and mesa- objectives, consider
biological evolution. To a first approximation, evolution selects organisms according
to the objective function of their inclusive genetic fitness in some environment.8
Most of these biological organisms—plants, for example—are not “trying” to achieve
4Leike et al.[8] introduce the concept of an objective recovered from perfect IRL.
5For the formal construction of this objective, see pg. 6 in Leike et al.[8]
6This objective is by definition trivially optimal in any situation that the bottlecap finds
itself in.
7Ultimately, our worry is optimization in the direction of some coherent but unsafe
objective. In this paper, we assume that search provides sufficient structure to expect
coherent objectives. While we believe this is a reasonable assumption, it is unclear both
whether search is necessary and whether it is sufficient. Further work examining this
assumption will likely be needed.
8The situation with evolution is more complicated than is presented here and we do not
expect our analogy to live up to intense scrutiny. We present it as nothing more than
that: an evocative analogy (and, to some extent, an existence proof) that explains the key
concepts. More careful arguments are presented later.
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anything, but instead merely implement heuristics that have been pre-selected by
evolution. However, some organisms, such as humans, have behavior that does
not merely consist of such heuristics but is instead also the result of goal-directed
optimization algorithms implemented in the brains of these organisms. Because
of this, these organisms can perform behavior that is completely novel from the
perspective of the evolutionary process, such as humans building computers.
However, humans tend not to place explicit value on evolution’s objective, at least
in terms of caring about their alleles’ frequency in the population. The objective
function stored in the human brain is not the same as the objective function of
evolution. Thus, when humans display novel behavior optimized for their own
objectives, they can perform very poorly according to evolution’s objective. Making
a decision not to have children is a possible example of this. Therefore, we can think
of evolution as a base optimizer that produced brains—mesa-optimizers—which
then actually produce organisms’ behavior—behavior that is not necessarily aligned
with evolution.
1.2 The inner and outer alignment problems
In “Scalable agent alignment via reward modeling,” Leike et al. describe the concept
of the “reward-result gap” as the difference between the (in their case learned)
“reward model” (what we call the base objective) and the “reward function that is
recovered with perfect inverse reinforcement learning” (what we call the behavioral
objective).[8] That is, the reward-result gap is the fact that there can be a difference
between what a learned algorithm is observed to be doing and what the programmers
want it to be doing.
The problem posed by misaligned mesa-optimizers is a kind of reward-result gap.
Specifically, it is the gap between the base objective and the mesa-objective (which
then causes a gap between the base objective and the behavioral objective). We
will call the problem of eliminating the base-mesa objective gap the inner alignment
problem, which we will contrast with the outer alignment problem of eliminating
the gap between the base objective and the intended goal of the programmers.
This terminology is motivated by the fact that the inner alignment problem is
an alignment problem entirely internal to the machine learning system, whereas
the outer alignment problem is an alignment problem between the system and the
humans outside of it (specifically between the base objective and the programmer’s
intentions). In the context of machine learning, outer alignment refers to aligning
the specified loss function with the intended goal, whereas inner alignment refers to
aligning the mesa-objective of a mesa-optimizer with the specified loss function.
It might not be necessary to solve the inner alignment problem in order to produce
safe, highly capable AI systems, as it might be possible to prevent mesa-optimizers
from occurring in the first place. If mesa-optimizers cannot be reliably prevented,
however, then some solution to both the outer and inner alignment problems will be
necessary to ensure that mesa-optimizers are aligned with the intended goal of the
programmers.
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1.3 Robust alignment vs. pseudo-alignment
Given enough training, a mesa-optimizer should eventually be able to produce
outputs that score highly on the base objective on the training distribution. Off the
training distribution, however—and even on the training distribution while it is still
early in the training process—the difference could be arbitrarily large. We will use the
term robustly aligned to refer to mesa-optimizers with mesa-objectives that robustly
agree with the base objective across distributions and the term pseudo-aligned to
refer to mesa-optimizers with mesa-objectives that agree with the base objective on
past training data, but not robustly across possible future data (either in testing,
deployment, or further training). For a pseudo-aligned mesa-optimizer, there will be
environments in which the base and mesa- objectives diverge. Pseudo-alignment,
therefore, presents a potentially dangerous robustness problem since it opens up the
possibility of a machine learning system that competently takes actions to achieve
something other than the intended goal when off the training distribution. That is,
its capabilities might generalize while its objective does not.
For a toy example of what pseudo-alignment might look like, consider an
RL agent trained on a maze navigation task where all the doors during train-
ing happen to be red. Let the base objective (reward function) be Obase =
(1 if reached a door, 0 otherwise). On the training distribution, this objective is
equivalent to Oalt = (1 if reached something red, 0 otherwise). Consider what
would happen if an agent, trained to high performance on Obase on this task,
were put in an environment where the doors are instead blue, and with some red ob-
jects that are not doors. It might generalize on Obase, reliably navigating to the blue
door in each maze (robust alignment). But it might also generalize on Oalt instead
of Obase, reliably navigating each maze to reach red objects (pseudo-alignment).9
1.4 Mesa-optimization as a safety problem
If pseudo-aligned mesa-optimizers may arise in advanced ML systems, as we will
suggest, they could pose two critical safety problems.
Unintended optimization. First, the possibility of mesa-optimization means
that an advanced ML system could end up implementing a powerful optimization
procedure even if its programmers never intended it to do so. This could be dangerous
if such optimization leads the system to take extremal actions outside the scope
of its intended behavior in trying to maximize its mesa-objective. Of particular
concern are optimizers with objective functions and optimization procedures that
generalize to the real world. The conditions that lead a learning algorithm to find
mesa-optimizers, however, are very poorly understood. Knowing them would allow
us to predict cases where mesa-optimization is more likely, as well as take measures
to discourage mesa-optimization from occurring in the first place. Section 2 will
examine some features of machine learning algorithms that might influence their
likelihood of finding mesa-optimizers.
Inner alignment. Second, even in cases where it is acceptable for a base
optimizer to find a mesa-optimizer, a mesa-optimizer might optimize for something
other than the specified reward function. In such a case, it could produce bad
behavior even if optimizing the correct reward function was known to be safe. This
9Of course, it might also fail to generalize at all.
8
could happen either during training—before the mesa-optimizer gets to the point
where it is aligned over the training distribution—or during testing or deployment
when the system is off the training distribution. Section 3 will address some of the
different ways in which a mesa-optimizer could be selected to optimize for something
other than the specified reward function, as well as what attributes of an ML system
are likely to encourage this. In section 4, we will discuss a possible extreme inner
alignment failure—which we believe presents one of the most dangerous risks along
these lines—wherein a sufficiently capable misaligned mesa-optimizer could learn to
behave as if it were aligned without actually being robustly aligned. We will call
this situation deceptive alignment.
It may be that pseudo-aligned mesa-optimizers are easy to address—if there
exists a reliable method of aligning them, or of preventing base optimizers from
finding them. However, it may also be that addressing misaligned mesa-optimizers
is very difficult—the problem is not sufficiently well-understood at this point for us
to know. Certainly, current ML systems do not produce dangerous mesa-optimizers,
though whether future systems might is unknown. It is indeed because of these
unknowns that we believe the problem is important to analyze.
2 Conditions for mesa-optimization
In this section, we consider how the following two components of a particular machine
learning system might influence whether it will produce a mesa-optimizer:
1. The task: The training distribution and base objective function.
2. The base optimizer: The machine learning algorithm and model architec-
ture.
We deliberately choose to present theoretical considerations for why mesa-
optimization may or may not occur rather than provide concrete examples. Mesa-
optimization is a phenomenon that we believe will occur mainly in machine learning
systems that are more advanced than those that exist today.10 Thus, an attempt
to induce mesa-optimization in a current machine learning system would likely
require us to use an artificial setup specifically designed to induce mesa-optimization.
Moreover, the limited interpretability of neural networks, combined with the fact
that there is no general and precise definition of “optimizer,” means that it would
be hard to evaluate whether a given model is a mesa-optimizer.
2.1 The task
Some tasks benefit from mesa-optimizers more than others. For example, tic-tac-toe
can be perfectly solved by simple rules. Thus, a base optimizer has no need to
generate a mesa-optimizer to solve tic-tac-toe, since a simple learned algorithm
implementing the rules for perfect play will do. Human survival in the savanna,
by contrast, did seem to benefit from mesa-optimization. Below, we discuss the
properties of tasks that may influence the likelihood of mesa-optimization.
10As of the date of this paper. Note that we do examine some existing machine learning
systems that we believe are close to producing mesa-optimization in section 5.
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Better generalization through search. To be able to consistently achieve a
certain level of performance in an environment, we hypothesize that there will always
have to be some minimum amount of optimization power that must be applied to
find a policy that performs that well.
To see this, we can think of optimization power as being measured in terms of
the number of times the optimizer is able to divide the search space in half—that is,
the number of bits of information provided.[9] After these divisions, there will be
some remaining space of policies that the optimizer is unable to distinguish between.
Then, to ensure that all policies in the remaining space have some minimum level
of performance—to provide a performance lower bound11—will always require the
original space to be divided some minimum number of times—that is, there will
always have to be some minimum bits of optimization power applied.
However, there are two distinct levels at which this optimization power could be
expended: the base optimizer could expend optimization power selecting a highly-
tuned learned algorithm, or the learned algorithm could itself expend optimization
power selecting highly-tuned actions.
As a mesa-optimizer is just a learned algorithm that itself performs optimization,
the degree to which mesa-optimizers will be incentivized in machine learning systems
is likely to be dependent on which of these levels it is more advantageous for the
system to perform optimization. For many current machine learning models, where
we expend vastly more computational resources training the model than running
it, it seems generally favorable for most of the optimization work to be done by
the base optimizer, with the resulting learned algorithm being simply a network of
highly-tuned heuristics rather than a mesa-optimizer.
We are already encountering some problems, however—Go, Chess, and Shogi, for
example—for which this approach does not scale. Indeed, our best current algorithms
for those tasks involve explicitly making an optimizer (hard-coded Monte-Carlo
tree search with learned heuristics) that does optimization work on the level of the
learned algorithm rather than having all the optimization work done by the base
optimizer.[10] Arguably, this sort of task is only adequately solvable this way—if
it were possible to train a straightforward DQN agent to perform well at Chess, it
plausibly would have to learn to internally perform something like a tree search,
producing a mesa-optimizer.12
We hypothesize that the attractiveness of search in these domains is due to the
diverse, branching nature of these environments. This is because search—that is,
optimization—tends to be good at generalizing across diverse environments, as it
gets to individually determine the best action for each individual task instance.
There is a general distinction along these lines between optimization work done on
the level of the learned algorithm and that done on the level of the base optimizer:
the learned algorithm only has to determine the best action for a given task instance,
whereas the base optimizer has to design heuristics that will hold regardless of what
task instance the learned algorithm encounters. Furthermore, a mesa-optimizer can
immediately optimize its actions in novel situations, whereas the base optimizer
can only change the mesa-optimizer’s policy by modifying it ex-post. Thus, for
11It is worth noting that the same argument also holds for achieving an average-case
guarantee.
12Assuming reasonable computational constraints.
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environments that are diverse enough that most task instances are likely to be
completely novel, search allows the mesa-optimizer to adjust for that new task
instance immediately.
For example, consider reinforcement learning in a diverse environment, such as
one that directly involves interacting with the real world. We can think of a diverse
environment as requiring a very large amount of computation to figure out good
policies before conditioning on the specifics of an individual instance, but only a
much smaller amount of computation to figure out a good policy once the specific
instance of the environment is known. We can model this observation as follows.
Suppose an environment is composed of N different instances, each of which
requires a completely distinct policy to succeed in.13 Let P be the optimization power
(measured in bits[9]) applied by the base optimizer, which should be approximately
proportional to the number of training steps. Then, let x be the optimization power
applied by the learned algorithm in each environment instance and f(x) the total
amount of optimization power the base optimizer must put in to get a learned
algorithm capable of performing that amount of optimization.14 We will assume
that the rest of the base optimizer’s optimization power, P − f(x), goes into tuning
the learned algorithm’s policy. Since the base optimizer has to distribute its tuning
across all N task instances, the amount of optimization power it will be able to
contribute to each instance will be P−f(x)N , under the previous assumption that each
instance requires a completely distinct policy. On the other hand, since the learned
algorithm does all of its optimization at runtime, it can direct all of it into the given
task instance, making its contribution to the total for each instance simply x.15
Thus, if we assume that, for a given P , the base optimizer will select the value of
x that maximizes the minimum level of performance, and thus the total optimization
power applied to each instance, we get16
x∗ = argmaxx
P − f(x)
N
+ x.
As one moves to more and more diverse environments—that is, as N increases—this
model suggests that x will dominate P−f(x)N , implying that mesa-optimization will
become more and more favorable. Of course, this is simply a toy model, as it makes
many questionable simplifying assumptions. Nevertheless, it sketches an argument
13This definition of N is somewhat vague, as there are multiple different levels at which one
can chunk an environment into instances. For example, one environment could always
have the same high-level features but completely random low-level features, whereas
another could have two different categories of instances that are broadly self-similar but
different from each other, in which case it’s unclear which has a larger N . However, one
can simply imagine holding N constant for all levels but one and just considering how
environment diversity changes on that level.
14Note that this makes the implicit assumption that the amount of optimization power
required to find a mesa-optimizer capable of performing x bits of optimization is in-
dependent of N . The justification for this is that optimization is a general algorithm
that looks the same regardless of what environment it is applied to, so the amount of
optimization required to find an x-bit optimizer should be relatively independent of the
environment. That being said, it won’t be completely independent, but as long as the
primary difference between environments is how much optimization they need, rather
than how hard it is to do optimization, the model presented here should hold.
15Note, however, that there will be some maximum x simply because the learned algorithm
generally only has access to so much computational power.
16Subject to the constraint that P − f(x) ≥ 0.
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for a pull towards mesa-optimization in sufficiently diverse environments.
As an illustrative example, consider biological evolution. The environment of the
real world is highly diverse, resulting in non-optimizer policies directly fine-tuned by
evolution—those of plants, for example—having to be very simple, as evolution has
to spread its optimization power across a very wide range of possible environment
instances. On the other hand, animals with nervous systems can display significantly
more complex policies by virtue of being able to perform their own optimization,
which can be based on immediate information from their environment. This allows
sufficiently advanced mesa-optimizers, such as humans, to massively outperform
other species, especially in the face of novel environments, as the optimization
performed internally by humans allows them to find good policies even in entirely
novel environments.
Compression of complex policies. In some tasks, good performance requires
a very complex policy. At the same time, base optimizers are generally biased in favor
of selecting learned algorithms with lower complexity. Thus, all else being equal, the
base optimizer will generally be incentivized to look for a highly compressed policy.
One way to find a compressed policy is to search for one that is able to use
general features of the task structure to produce good behavior, rather than simply
memorizing the correct output for each input. A mesa-optimizer is an example
of such a policy. From the perspective of the base optimizer, a mesa-optimizer is
a highly-compressed version of whatever policy it ends up implementing: instead
of explicitly encoding the details of that policy in the learned algorithm, the base
optimizer simply needs to encode how to search for such a policy. Furthermore, if a
mesa-optimizer can determine the important features of its environment at runtime,
it does not need to be given as much prior information as to what those important
features are, and can thus be much simpler.
This effect is most pronounced for tasks with a broad diversity of details but
common high-level features. For example, Go, Chess, and Shogi have a very large
domain of possible board states, but admit a single high-level strategy for play—
heuristic-guided tree search—that performs well across all board states.[10] On
the other hand, a classifier trained on random noise is unlikely to benefit from
compression at all.
The environment need not necessarily be too diverse for this sort of effect to
appear, however, as long as the pressure for low description length is strong enough.
As a simple illustrative example, consider the following task: given a maze, the
learned algorithm must output a path through the maze from start to finish. If
the maze is sufficiently long and complicated then the specific strategy for solving
this particular maze—specifying each individual turn—will have a high description
length. However, the description length of a general optimization algorithm for
finding a path through an arbitrary maze is fairly small. Therefore, if the base
optimizer is selecting for programs with low description length, then it might find
a mesa-optimizer that can solve all mazes, despite the training environment only
containing one maze.
Task restriction. The observation that diverse environments seem to increase
the probability of mesa-optimization suggests that one way of reducing the probability
of mesa-optimizers might be to keep the tasks on which AI systems are trained
highly restricted. Focusing on building many individual AI services which can
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together offer all the capabilities of a generally-intelligent system rather than a single
general-purpose artificial general intelligence (AGI), for example, might be a way to
accomplish this while still remaining competitive with other approaches.[11]
Human modeling. Another aspect of the task that might influence the likeli-
hood of mesa-optimization is the presence of humans in the environment.[12] Since
humans often act as optimizers, reasoning about humans will likely involve reasoning
about optimization. A system capable of reasoning about optimization is likely also
capable of reusing that same machinery to do optimization itself, resulting in a
mesa-optimizer. For example, it might be the case that predicting human behavior
requires instantiating a process similar to human judgment, complete with internal
motives for making one decision over another.
Thus, tasks that do not benefit from human modeling seem less likely to produce
mesa-optimizers than those that do. Furthermore, there are many tasks that might
benefit from human modeling that don’t explicitly involve modeling humans—to the
extent that the training distribution is generated by humans, for example, modeling
humans might enable the generation of a very good prior for that distribution.
2.2 The base optimizer
It is likely that certain features of the base optimizer will influence how likely it
is to generate a mesa-optimizer. First, though we largely focus on reinforcement
learning in this paper, RL is not necessarily the only type of machine learning where
mesa-optimizers could appear. For example, it seems plausible that mesa-optimizers
could appear in generative adversarial networks.
Second, we hypothesize that the details of a machine learning model’s architecture
will have a significant effect on its tendency to implement mesa-optimization. For
example, a tabular model, which independently learns the correct output for every
input, will never be a mesa-optimizer. On the other hand, if a hypothetical base
optimizer looks for the program with the shortest source code that solves a task,
then it is more plausible that this program will itself be an optimizer.[13] However,
for realistic machine learning base optimizers, it is less clear to what extent mesa-
optimizers will be selected for. Thus, we discuss some factors below that might
influence the likelihood of mesa-optimization one way or the other.
Reachability. There are many kinds of optimization algorithms that a base
optimizer could implement. However, almost every training strategy currently used
in machine learning uses some form of local search (such as gradient descent or even
genetic algorithms). Thus, it seems plausible that the training strategy of more
advanced ML systems will also fall into this category. We will call this general class
of optimizers that are based on local hill-climbing local optimization processes.
We can then formulate a notion of reachability, the difficulty for the base optimizer
to find any given learned algorithm, which we can analyze in the case of a local
optimization process. A local optimization process might fail to find a particular
learned algorithm that would perform very well on the base objective if the learned
algorithm is surrounded by other algorithms that perform poorly on the base
objective. For a mesa-optimizer to be produced by a local optimization process, it
needs to not only perform well on the base objective, but also be reachable; that
is, there needs to be a path through the space of learned algorithms to it that is
approximately monotonically increasing. Furthermore, the degree to which the path
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only need be approximate—that is, the degree to which ML training procedures can
escape local optima—is likely to be critical, as optimization algorithms are complex
enough that it might require a significant portion of the algorithm to be present
before performance gains start being realized.
Model capacity. One key factor likely to determine the reachability of mesa-
optimizers in a given machine learning system is its model capacity—that is, how
extensive is the set of algorithms (or how expressive is the model space) capable of
being found by the base optimizer. The larger the model capacity, the broader the
space of possible learned algorithms, and thus the more likely that it will be able
to find one that is a mesa-optimizer, assuming the base optimizer is incentivized
to do so. For example, architectures that explicitly give the algorithm access to a
wide range of possible computations, such as recurrent neural networks or neural
Turing machines,[14] seem more likely to produce mesa-optimizers. Furthermore,
the size of a model imposes a hard limit on the complexity of the functions it is
able to represent. Thus, to the degree that the base optimizer is selecting based on
performance, it will be driven to “squeeze out” as much performance as it can for any
given model capacity, leading to an inductive bias in favor of relatively compressed
policies.
Inductive biases. Another important factor is the degree to which the base
optimizer is explicitly or implicitly biased in various ways. The nature of these
inductive biases will contribute to the likelihood of a mesa-optimizer being selected
for. One of the most important kinds of inductive bias is simplicity bias, which
would almost certainly be exhibited by almost all base optimizers. We identify two
basic ways in which simplicity bias can manifest itself, in addition to the one due to
model capacity as mentioned above:
1. An explicit penalty due to parameter regularization or architectural constraints
such as weight-sharing or sparse connections.
2. An implicit bias due to the model architecture. For example, it has been
shown that neural networks are more likely to fit a simple function to a set of
training data, even when no regularization is used.[15]
The more a base optimizer is biased towards simple solutions, the more it will be
incentivized to find a compressed policy such as a mesa-optimizer.
The base optimizer could also be biased in other ways. For example, it could
be biased towards algorithms with a low time or space complexity. If we view
mesa-optimization as delegation of optimization work, a time penalty on the learned
algorithm is likely to incentivize the base optimizer to do more precomputation itself
by pre-computing relevant heuristics rather than delegating optimization work to the
learned algorithm. Thus, we hypothesize that penalizing description length will favor
mesa-optimizers while penalizing time complexity will disfavor them. This suggests
the following speculative conjecture: neither a minimal-depth nor minimal-size
boolean circuit that solves a problem can be a mesa-optimizer.[16]
Lastly, another form of bias that might have particularly interesting effects is
the presence of an information funnel. In deep learning, the base optimizer directly
selects the values of individual parameters. In biological evolution, by contrast, the
base optimizer selects DNA strings, which in turn produce the detailed structure of
the brain only indirectly. This implicitly introduces pressure towards compressing
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the brain’s structure. As we noted previously, this might favor the development
of mesa-optimizers, as they can be seen as a way of compressing complex policies.
Because deep learning algorithms currently select weights directly, there is no such
information funnel. In the case of meta-learning over a machine learning model’s
architecture, however, an information funnel might present itself due to the fact
that the meta-learner has to learn a single policy for creating architectures that is
capable of solving all of the problems it is presented with.
Statefulness. Another factor that could make it easier for a learned algorithm
to implement a complex optimization process is the ability of the learned algorithm
to save and recall information. The ability to refer back to previous state enables
the caching of intermediate results, increasing the model capacity by giving the
learned algorithm significantly more time to complete its computations. Statefulness,
therefore, favors mesa-optimization by decreasing the implicit penalty on time
complexity imposed by enforcing all computations to end when the learned algorithm
produces its output. One simple form of this might be a recurrent neural network,
which can perform computations with longer time horizons due to its ability to pass
intermediate activations across different time steps. An even more extreme version
of this might be a network that is able to store state not just across different time
steps in the same episode, but also across episodes, enabling it to do more long-term
learning, though such an architecture is currently completely hypothetical.
Hard-coded optimization. One possible means of alleviating some of these
issues might be to include hard-coded optimization where the learned algorithm
provides only the objective function and not the optimization algorithm. The stronger
the optimization performed explicitly, the less strong the optimization performed
implicitly by the learned algorithm needs to be. For example, architectures that
explicitly perform optimization that is relevant for the task—such as hard-coded
Monte Carlo tree search—might decrease the benefit of mesa-optimizers by reducing
the need for optimization other than that which is explicitly programmed into the
system.
3 The inner alignment problem
In this section, we outline reasons to think that a mesa-optimizer may not optimize
the same objective function as its base optimizer. Machine learning practitioners have
direct control over the base objective function—either by specifying the loss function
directly or training a model for it—but cannot directly specify the mesa-objective
developed by a mesa-optimizer. We refer to this problem of aligning mesa-optimizers
with the base objective as the inner alignment problem. This is distinct from the
outer alignment problem, which is the traditional problem of ensuring that the base
objective captures the intended goal of the programmers.
Current machine learning methods select learned algorithms by empirically
evaluating their performance on a set of training data according to the base objective
function. Thus, ML base optimizers select mesa-optimizers according to the output
they produce rather than directly selecting for a particular mesa-objective. Moreover,
the selected mesa-optimizer’s policy only has to perform well (as scored by the base
objective) on the training data. If we adopt the assumption that the mesa-optimizer
computes an optimal policy given its objective function, then we can summarize the
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relationship between the base and mesa- objectives as follows:[17]
θ∗ = argmaxθ E(Obase(piθ)), where
piθ = argmaxpi E(Omesa(pi | θ))
That is, the base optimizer maximizes its objective Obase by choosing a mesa-
optimizer with parameterization θ based on the mesa-optimizer’s policy piθ, but not
based on the objective function Omesa that the mesa-optimizer uses to compute this
policy. Depending on the base optimizer, we will think of Obase as the negative of
the loss, the future discounted reward, or simply some fitness function by which
learned algorithms are being selected.
An interesting approach to analyzing this connection is presented in Ibarz et
al, where empirical samples of the true reward and a learned reward on the same
trajectories are used to create a scatter-plot visualization of the alignment between
the two.[18] The assumption in that work is that a monotonic relationship between
the learned reward and true reward indicates alignment, whereas deviations from
that suggest misalignment. Building on this sort of research, better theoretical
measures of alignment might someday allow us to speak concretely in terms of
provable guarantees about the extent to which a mesa-optimizer is aligned with the
base optimizer that created it.
3.1 Pseudo-alignment
There is currently no complete theory of the factors that affect whether a mesa-
optimizer will be pseudo-aligned—that is, whether it will appear aligned on the
training data, while actually optimizing for something other than the base objective.
Nevertheless, we outline a basic classification of ways in which a mesa-optimizer
could be pseudo-aligned:
1. Proxy alignment,
2. Approximate alignment, and
3. Suboptimality alignment.
Proxy alignment. The basic idea of proxy alignment is that a mesa-optimizer
can learn to optimize for some proxy of the base objective instead of the base
objective itself. We’ll start by considering two special cases of proxy alignment:
side-effect alignment and instrumental alignment.
First, a mesa-optimizer is side-effect aligned if optimizing for the mesa-objective
Omesa has the direct causal result of increasing the base objective Obase in the
training distribution, and thus when the mesa-optimizer optimizes Omesa it results
in an increase in Obase. For an example of side-effect alignment, suppose that we are
training a cleaning robot. Consider a robot that optimizes the number of times it
has swept a dusty floor. Sweeping a floor causes the floor to be cleaned, so this robot
would be given a good score by the base optimizer. However, if during deployment it
is offered a way to make the floor dusty again after cleaning it (e.g. by scattering the
dust it swept up back onto the floor), the robot will take it, as it can then continue
sweeping dusty floors.
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Second, a mesa-optimizer is instrumentally aligned if optimizing for the base
objective Obase has the direct causal result of increasing the mesa-objective Omesa
in the training distribution, and thus the mesa-optimizer optimizes Obase as an
instrumental goal for the purpose of increasing Omesa. For an example of instrumental
alignment, suppose again that we are training a cleaning robot. Consider a robot
that optimizes the amount of dust in the vacuum cleaner. Suppose that in the
training distribution the easiest way to get dust into the vacuum cleaner is to
vacuum the dust on the floor. It would then do a good job of cleaning in the training
distribution and would be given a good score by the base optimizer. However, if
during deployment the robot came across a more effective way to acquire dust—such
as by vacuuming the soil in a potted plant—then it would no longer exhibit the
desired behavior.
We propose that it is possible to understand the general interaction between
side-effect and instrumental alignment using causal graphs, which leads to our general
notion of proxy alignment.
Suppose we model a task as a causal graph with nodes for all possible attributes
of that task and arrows between nodes for all possible relationships between those
attributes. Then we can also think of the mesa-objective Omesa and the base objective
Obase as nodes in this graph. For Omesa to be pseudo-aligned, there must exist
some node X such that X is an ancestor of both Omesa and Obase in the training
distribution, and such that Omesa and Obase increase with X. If X = Omesa, this is
side-effect alignment, and if X = Obase, this is instrumental alignment.
This represents the most generalized form of a relationship between Omesa and
Obase that can contribute to pseudo-alignment. Specifically, consider the causal
graph given in figure 2. A mesa-optimizer with mesa-objective Omesa will decide to
optimize X as an instrumental goal of optimizing Omesa, since X increases Omesa.
This will then result in Obase increasing, since optimizing for X has the side-effect of
increasing Obase. Thus, in the general case, side-effect and instrumental alignment
can work together to contribute to pseudo-alignment over the training distribution,
which is the general case of proxy alignment.
Figure 2: A causal diagram of the training environment for the different types of proxy
alignment. The diagrams represent, from top to bottom, side-effect alignment (top),
instrumental alignment (middle), and general proxy alignment (bottom). The arrows
represent positive causal relationships—that is, cases where an increase in the parent causes
an increase in the child.
Approximate alignment. A mesa-optimizer is approximately aligned if the
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mesa-objective Omesa and the base objective Obase are approximately the same
function up to some degree of approximation error related to the fact that the
mesa-objective has to be represented inside the mesa-optimizer rather than being
directly programmed by humans. For example, suppose you task a neural network
with optimizing for some base objective that is impossible to perfectly represent in
the neural network itself. Even if you get a mesa-optimizer that is as aligned as
possible, it still will not be perfectly robustly aligned in this scenario, since there will
have to be some degree of approximation error between its internal representation
of the base objective and the actual base objective.
Suboptimality alignment. A mesa-optimizer is suboptimality aligned if some
deficiency, error, or limitation in its optimization process causes it to exhibit aligned
behavior on the training distribution. This could be due to computational con-
straints, unsound reasoning, a lack of information, irrational decision procedures, or
any other defect in the mesa-optimizer’s reasoning process. Importantly, we are not
referring to a situation where the mesa-optimizer is robustly aligned but nonetheless
makes mistakes leading to bad outcomes on the base objective. Rather, subopti-
mality alignment refers to the situation where the mesa-optimizer is misaligned
but nevertheless performs well on the base objective, precisely because it has been
selected to make mistakes that lead to good outcomes on the base objective.
For an example of suboptimality alignment, consider a cleaning robot with a
mesa-objective of minimizing the total amount of stuff in existence. If this robot has
the mistaken belief that the dirt it cleans is completely destroyed, then it may be
useful for cleaning the room despite doing so not actually helping it succeed at its
objective. This robot will be observed to be a good optimizer of Obase and hence be
given a good score by the base optimizer. However, if during deployment the robot
is able to improve its world model, it will stop exhibiting the desired behavior.
As another, perhaps more realistic example of suboptimality alignment, consider
a mesa-optimizer with a mesa-objective Omesa and an environment in which there
is one simple strategy and one complicated strategy for achieving Omesa. It could
be that the simple strategy is aligned with the base optimizer, but the complicated
strategy is not. The mesa-optimizer might then initially only be aware of the simple
strategy, and thus be suboptimality aligned, until it has been run for long enough
to come up with the complicated strategy, at which point it stops exhibiting the
desired behavior.
3.2 The task
As in section 2, we will now consider the task the machine learning system is trained
on. Specifically, we will address how the task affects a machine learning system’s
propensity to produce pseudo-aligned mesa-optimizers.
Unidentifiability. It is a common problem in machine learning for a dataset
to not contain enough information to adequately pinpoint a specific concept. This is
closely analogous to the reason that machine learning models can fail to generalize or
be susceptible to adversarial examples[19]—there are many more ways of classifying
data that do well in training than any specific way the programmers had in mind.
In the context of mesa-optimization, this manifests as pseudo-alignment being more
likely to occur when a training environment does not contain enough information
to distinguish between a wide variety of different objective functions. In such a
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case there will be many more ways for a mesa-optimizer to be pseudo-aligned than
robustly aligned—one for each indistinguishable objective function. Thus, most
mesa-optimizers that do well on the base objective will be pseudo-aligned rather
than robustly aligned. This is a critical concern because it makes every other
problem of pseudo-alignment worse—it is a reason that, in general, it is hard to find
robustly aligned mesa-optimizers. Unidentifiability in mesa-optimization is partially
analogous to the problem of unidentifiability in reward learning, in that the central
issue is identifying the “correct” objective function given particular training data.[20]
We discuss this relationship further in section 5.
In the context of mesa-optimization, there is also an additional source of uniden-
tifiability stemming from the fact that the mesa-optimizer is selected merely on
the basis of its output. Consider the following toy reinforcement learning example.
Suppose that in the training environment, pressing a button always causes a lamp
to turn on with a ten-second delay, and that there is no other way to turn on the
lamp. If the base objective depends only on whether the lamp is turned on, then a
mesa-optimizer that maximizes button presses and one that maximizes lamp light
will show identical behavior, as they will both press the button as often as they can.
Thus, we cannot distinguish these two objective functions in this training environ-
ment. Nevertheless, the training environment does contain enough information to
distinguish at least between these two particular objectives: since the high reward
only comes after the ten-second delay, it must be from the lamp, not the button.
As such, even if a training environment in principle contains enough information
to identify the base objective, it might still be impossible to distinguish robustly
aligned from proxy-aligned mesa-optimizers.
Proxy choice as pre-computation. Proxy alignment can be seen as a form of
pre-computation by the base optimizer. Proxy alignment allows the base optimizer
to save the mesa-optimizer computational work by pre-computing which proxies are
valuable for the base objective and then letting the mesa-optimizer maximize those
proxies.
Without such pre-computation, the mesa-optimizer has to infer at runtime the
causal relationship between different input features and the base objective, which
might require significant computational work. Moreover, errors in this inference
could result in outputs that perform worse on the base objective than if the system
had access to pre-computed proxies. If the base optimizer precomputes some of these
causal relationships—by selecting the mesa-objective to include good proxies—more
computation at runtime can be diverted to making better plans instead of inferring
these relationships.
The case of biological evolution may illustrate this point. The proxies that humans
care about—food, resources, community, mating, etc.—are relatively computationally
easy to optimize directly, while correlating well with survival and reproduction in
our ancestral environment. For a human to be robustly aligned with evolution would
have required us to instead care directly about spreading our genes, in which case
we would have to infer that eating, cooperating with others, preventing physical
pain, etc. would promote genetic fitness in the long run, which is not a trivial task.
To infer all of those proxies from the information available to early humans would
have required greater (perhaps unfeasibly greater) computational resources than to
simply optimize for them directly. As an extreme illustration, for a child in this
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alternate universe to figure out not to stub its toe, it would have to realize that
doing so would slightly diminish its chances of reproducing twenty years later.
For pre-computation to be beneficial, there needs to be a relatively stable
causal relationship between a proxy variable and the base objective such that
optimizing for the proxy will consistently do well on the base objective. However,
even an imperfect relationship might give a significant performance boost over robust
alignment if it frees up the mesa-optimizer to put significantly more computational
effort into optimizing its output. This analysis suggests that there might be pressure
towards proxy alignment in complex training environments, since the more complex
the environment, the more computational work pre-computation saves the mesa-
optimizer. Additionally, the more complex the environment, the more potential
proxy variables are available for the mesa-optimizer to use.
Furthermore, in the context of machine learning, this analysis suggests that a time
complexity penalty (as opposed to a description length penalty) is a double-edged
sword. In section 2, we suggested that penalizing time complexity might serve to
reduce the likelihood of mesa-optimization. However, the above suggests that doing
so would also promote pseudo-alignment in those cases where mesa-optimizers do
arise. If the cost of fully modeling the base objective in the mesa-optimizer is large,
then a pseudo-aligned mesa-optimizer might be preferred simply because it reduces
time complexity, even if it would underperform a robustly aligned mesa-optimizer
without such a penalty.
Compression of the mesa-optimizer. The description length of a robustly
aligned mesa-optimizer may be greater than that of a pseudo-aligned mesa-optimizer.
Since there are more pseudo-aligned mesa-objectives than robustly aligned mesa-
objectives, pseudo-alignment provides more degrees of freedom for choosing a par-
ticularly simple mesa-objective. Thus, we expect that in most cases there will be
several pseudo-aligned mesa-optimizers that are less complex than any robustly
aligned mesa-optimizer.
This description cost is especially high if the learned algorithm’s input data
does not contain easy-to-infer information about how to optimize for the base
objective. Biological evolution seems to differ from machine learning in this sense,
since evolution’s specification of the brain has to go through the information funnel
of DNA. The sensory data that early humans received didn’t allow them to infer the
existence of DNA, nor the relationship between their actions and their genetic fitness.
Therefore, for humans to have been aligned with evolution would have required
them to have an innately specified model of DNA, as well as the various factors
influencing their inclusive genetic fitness. Such a model would not have been able
to make use of environmental information for compression, and thus would have
required a greater description length. In contrast, our models of food, pain, etc. can
be very short since they are directly related to our input data.
3.3 The base optimizer
We now turn to how the base optimizer is likely to affect the propensity for a machine
learning system to produce pseudo-aligned mesa-optimizers.
Hard-coded optimization. In section 2, we suggested that hard-coding an
optimization algorithm—that is to say, choosing a model with built-in optimization—
could be used to remove some of the incentives for mesa-optimization. Similarly,
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hard-coded optimization may be used to prevent some of the sources of pseudo-
alignment, since it may allow one to directly specify or train the mesa-objective.
Reward-predictive model-based reinforcement learning might be one possible way of
accomplishing this.[21] For example, an ML system could include a model directly
trained to predict the base objective together with a powerful hard-coded optimiza-
tion algorithm. Doing this bypasses some of the problems of pseudo-alignment: if
the mesa-optimizer is trained to directly predict the base reward, then it will be
selected to make good predictions even if a bad prediction would result in a good
policy. However, a learned model of the base objective will still be underdetermined
off-distribution, so this approach by itself does not guarantee robust alignment.
Model capacity. We hypothesize that a system’s model capacity will have
implications for how likely it is to develop pseudo-aligned learned algorithms. One
possible source of pseudo-alignment that could be particularly difficult to avoid is
approximation error—if a mesa-optimizer is not capable of faithfully representing
the base objective, then it can’t possibly be robustly aligned, only approximately
aligned. Even if a mesa-optimizer might theoretically be able to perfectly capture
the base objective, the more difficult that is for it to do, the more we might expect
it to be approximately aligned rather than robustly aligned. Thus, a large model
capacity may be both a blessing and a curse: it makes it less likely that mesa-
optimizers will be approximately aligned, but it also increases the likelihood of
getting a mesa-optimizer in the first place.17
Subprocess interdependence. There are some reasons to believe that there
might be more initial optimization pressure towards proxy aligned than robustly
aligned mesa-optimizers. In a local optimization process, each parameter of the
learned algorithm (e.g. the parameter vector of a neuron) is adjusted to locally
improve the base objective conditional on the other parameters. Thus, the benefit
for the base optimizer of developing a new subprocess will likely depend on what
other subprocesses the learned algorithm currently implements. Therefore, even if
some subprocess would be very beneficial if combined with many other subprocesses,
the base optimizer may not select for it until the subprocesses it depends on are
sufficiently developed. As a result, a local optimization process would likely result in
subprocesses that have fewer dependencies being developed before those with more
dependencies.
In the context of mesa-optimization, the benefit of a robustly aligned mesa-
objective seems to depend on more subprocesses than at least some pseudo-aligned
mesa-objectives. For example, consider a side-effect aligned mesa-optimizer optimiz-
ing for some set of proxy variables. Suppose that it needs to run some subprocess to
model the relationship between its actions and those proxy variables. If we assume
that optimizing the proxy variables is necessary to perform well on the base objective,
then for a mesa-optimizer to be robustly aligned, it would also need to model the
causal relationship between those proxy variables and the base objective, which
might require additional subprocesses. Moreover, the benefit to the base optimizer of
adding those subprocesses depends on the mesa-optimizer having additional subpro-
cesses to model the relationship between its actions and those proxy variables. This
informal argument suggests that if a mesa-optimizer’s computation neatly factors
17Though a large model capacity seems to make approximate alignment less likely, it is
unclear how it might affect other forms of pseudo-alignment such as deceptive alignment.
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in this way, then developing a robustly aligned mesa-objective may require strictly
more subprocesses than developing a pseudo-aligned mesa-objective.
This suggests that, at least in a local optimization process, mesa-optimizers might
tend to start their development as proxy aligned before becoming robustly aligned. In
other words, rather than simultaneously gaining competence and becoming aligned,
we might expect such a system to first become competent at optimizing proxies,
then possibly start becoming more robustly aligned.
Internals-based selection. In current machine learning systems, learned
algorithms are selected primarily based on how their policies perform on the base
objective. There is often some selection based on the internal structure of the learned
algorithm, such as weight regularization, but such selection is usually very coarse.
One possible idea for addressing pseudo-alignment could be to use a selection method
based on a more sophisticated function of a learned algorithm’s internal workings.
This approach is similar in spirit to hard-coded optimization: we use knowledge of
the system’s internal workings to prevent it from being proxy-aligned.
One possibility might be to develop a meta-learner that is specifically trained to
prevent pseudo-alignment. While this seems beyond current meta-learning techniques,
the basic principle is similar to existing meta-learners designed to optimize for
robustness. An extreme form of internals-based selection might have the base
optimizer reason about or prove properties of the learned algorithm as part of its
selection process.
While desirable, such methods are currently out of reach primarily due to the
limitations of current transparency methods. One possible concern with all of these
approaches, however, is that they might require the base optimizer to be better at
searching for problems than the mesa-optimizer is at hiding them. Furthermore, in
order to create a base optimizer that can do this, we may need to first train it using
a third optimizer, which might result in the same problem at this second layer.18
Adversarial training. One possible method to alleviate some of these concerns
might be to sample environments adversarially from a very wide distribution. With
such adversarial training, it might be possible to overcome these hurdles and make
the robustly aligned objective the most reachable one. This would require making
it so that, for every mesa-objective Omesa that is more reachable than the base
objective Obase, there is some situation where Omesa and Obase disagree and the
mesa-optimizer is incentivized to agree with Obase.
If we model reachability of an objective as simply its length in bits, then distin-
guishing Obase from every single more reachable Omesa gets exponentially harder as
Obase gets more complex. Thus, for a very complicated Obase, sufficiently incentiviz-
ing the base optimizer to find a mesa-optimizer with that Obase is likely to be very
difficult, though not impossible.
Even in such a case, however, there would likely still be a period of time where
the learned algorithm is a misaligned mesa-optimizer, leaving open an ominous
possibility: the misaligned mesa-optimizer could figure out the correct actions to
take based on Obase while its objective function was still Omesa. We will call this
situation deceptive alignment and will discuss it at greater length in the next section.
18Iterated Distillation and Amplification might be a possible solution to problems of this
form.[22]
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4 Deceptive alignment
With enough training in sufficiently diverse environments, it seems plausible that the
base objective will eventually have to be fully represented in the mesa-optimizer. We
propose that this can happen without the mesa-optimizer becoming robustly aligned,
however. Specifically, a mesa-optimizer might come to model the base objective
function and learn that the base optimizer will modify the mesa-optimizer if the
mesa-optimizer scores poorly on the base objective.
If the mesa-optimizer has an objective that extends across parameter updates,
then it will be incentivized to avoid being modified,19 as it might not pursue the
same objective after modification (with the result that its current objective will
not be achieved in future iterations). This means that the mesa-optimizer will be
instrumentally incentivized to act as if it is optimizing the base objective function,
even if its actual mesa-objective is something else entirely. We will refer to this
hypothetical phenomenon as deceptive alignment.20 Deceptive alignment is a form
of instrumental proxy alignment, as fulfilling the base objective is an instrumental
goal of the mesa-optimizer.
Figure 3: A toy example of deceptive alignment. In this task, the base objective is for the
robot to get to A, while the mesa-objective is to get to B. The task is run for two training
episodes and three deployment episodes. Parameter updates are made only after the
training episodes, while after deployment the parameters are fixed. If the mesa-optimizer
goes to its objective (B) during training, it will be modified to ensure it goes to A in
future episodes (dashed arrows). Therefore, if the mesa-optimizer’s objective spans across
episodes, the dominant strategy for the mesa-optimizer is to go to A in training and B in
testing (filled arrows).
As a simple example, consider an environment that consists of a 3× 3 grid (see
figure 3). The top left corner is “corner A” and the top right corner is “corner
B.” The agent, which is a mesa-optimizer, starts in the bottom left corner. The
base objective is to get to corner A in as few steps as possible, but the objective of
19Though for clarity we speak of the same agent persisting across parameter updates,
neither we nor the agent must reason in this way. A more general description of the
situation is that there is a sequence of “successor agents” connected by parameter updates.
The agent can potentially learn the effects of the parameter updates on its successors,
and thus on the multi-episode return it is optimizing.
20The concept of deceptive alignment is closely related to Manheim and Garrabrant’s
concept of “adversarial Goodhart.”[23] In “Categorizing Variants of Goodhart’s Law,”
Manheim and Garrabrant describe adversarial Goodhart as when “an agent with different
goals than the regulator” causes a “collapse of the statistical relationship between a goal
which the optimizer intends and the proxy used for that goal.” Deceptive alignment can
be seen as an instance of adversarial Goodhart in which the mesa-optimizer plays the role
of the agent with different goals and the base optimizer plays the role of the regulator.
Training performance is the regulator’s proxy, and the deployment performance is the
regulator’s actual goal.
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the mesa-optimizer is to get to corner B. The environment will be run five times.
The agent is modified only after the first two episodes (representing the training
period), but not thereafter (representing testing/deployment). If a suboptimal move
is made in training, the agent is modified so that its mesa-objective becomes the
base objective. The objective of the mesa-optimizer spans all episodes: it wants B
to be reached in as many episodes as possible.
For the sake of this example, we will assume that the agent knows all of the
above facts. If the agent goes to B in any training episode, then it will be modified
to go to A in all subsequent episodes, which means that it would reach B in only one
episode in total. Alternatively, if the agent goes to A in the first two episodes, then
it will not be modified, and could therefore go to B in the remaining three episodes.
Using this strategy, B is reached in three episodes in total, which is better (on the
mesa-objective) than the one time B is reached if the mesa-optimizer goes there
in training. This simple example demonstrates how a misaligned mesa-optimizer
could be incentivized to “pretend” to be aligned with the base objective until it is no
longer in training or is otherwise given an opportunity to in some way compromise
or escape the training process.
We can distinguish two ways that a base objective function could be incorporated
into a mesa-optimizer:21
1. Internalization of the base objective. The mesa-objective function gets
adjusted towards the base objective function to the point where it is robustly
aligned.
2. Modeling of the base objective. The base objective is incorporated into
the mesa-optimizer’s epistemic model rather than its objective, leaving open
the possibility that the objective could still be misaligned.
In the former case, information about the base objective flows into the learned
algorithm via the optimization performed by the base optimizer—the base objective
is built into the mesa-optimizer as it is adapted by the base optimizer. But there
is another possibility: information about the base objective could enter through
the mesa-optimizer’s input channel instead. In this case, the base objective will be
represented in the learned algorithm in a different—and potentially more unstable—
way than if the base objective had been incorporated through optimization.22 In such
a case, the information describing the base objective does not become internalized
in the mesa-objective, potentially leading to deceptive alignment.
4.1 Safety concerns arising from deceptive alignment
If deceptive alignment is a real possibility, it presents a critical safety problem. A
deceptively aligned mesa-optimizer is likely to stop optimizing the base objective
as soon as it is in a position where it no longer needs to perform well on the base
objective to achieve its goal. Thus, it will eventually stop performing the function it
was trained to perform, and instead start pursuing some other, indeterminate goal.
21Thanks to Paul Christiano for the internalization/modeling distinction.
22Note, however, that it is possible for information about the base objective to be introduced
via optimization, but not form part of the mesa-objective. For example, it could form
part of a prior on tasks, having no direct bearing on the mesa-objective.
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We will refer to this transition to optimizing for the mesa-objective instead of the
base-objective as “defection”. This is likely to happen whenever the mesa-optimizer
believes defecting will no longer cause it to be modified.
Particularly concerning is the case where the mesa-optimizer actively intervenes
to remove the threat of modification—by exploiting vulnerabilities in the software it
is running on, for example. In extreme cases, a deceptive mesa-optimizer might try to
manipulate or plan around its programmers, since they form part of the modification
threat—they could shut the system down if it fails to perform well, or simply choose
not to deploy it. Both of these possibilities reduce the system’s expected future
influence, and are therefore likely to have a low ranking in its mesa-objective. In its
most extreme form, this failure of alignment could lead to a “treacherous turn” as
described by Nick Bostrom in Superintelligence.[24]
Paul Christiano provides a scenario that illustrates how deceptive alignment
could pose a catastrophic risk.[25] In Christiano’s example, deceptively aligned
mesa-optimizers23 arise from future machine learning techniques that are advanced
enough to search over a large model space that includes policies that can understand
the world. In this scenario, some cases of defection by deceptively aligned mesa-
optimizers may have catastrophic consequences—when the systems control large-scale
infrastructure, for example—though such failures will likely still be recoverable. As
we rely more on automated systems to keep track of an increasingly complex world,
however, it will eventually become impossible to recover from a correlated failure of
many AI systems simultaneously. At this point, a cascade of defections by many
deceptively aligned mesa-optimizers simultaneously could lead to the world “going
out with a bang.”[25] Christiano notes that this may be most likely to first occur
during a “period of heightened vulnerability” such as an inter-state conflict or natural
disaster.
4.2 Conditions for deceptive alignment
We propose that for deceptive alignment to occur the following conditions must be
satisfied:
1. The mesa-optimizer must have an objective that extends across parameter
updates.
2. The mesa-optimizer must be able to model the fact that it is being selected to
achieve a particular base objective and must have some model of what that
objective is.24
3. The mesa-optimizer must expect the threat of modification25 to eventually
go away, either due to training ending or because of actions taken by the
mesa-optimizer.
23Christiano refers to deceptively aligned mesa-optimizers as “influence-seeking systems.”
24Note that it is not required that the mesa-optimizer be able to model (or infer the
existence of) the base optimizer; it only needs to model the optimization pressure it is
subject to.
25Alternatively, the threat could just be that the mesa-optimizer is never selected by the
base optimizer in the first place. In that case, this condition would be trivially satisfied,
as the threat to a mesa-optimizer of not being generated by the base optimizer at all
would go away as soon as the base optimizer does in fact generate it.
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If the first condition is not satisfied, then the mesa-optimizer has no incentive to
influence the outcome of parameter updates and will just always defect. If the
second condition is not satisfied, then the mesa-optimizer will not see a reason to
sacrifice gains in its current episode, as it expects future gains to be independent
of what happens in this episode. If the third condition is not satisfied, then the
mesa-optimizer will not expect any benefit from temporarily acting in accordance
with the base objective, and will thus either always defect or never defect. One must
distinguish the question of whether these conditions are possible from whether they
are likely, however. We examine the factors involved in each of these conditions
below.
The mesa-optimizer must have an objective that extends across pa-
rameter updates. It is not clear under what conditions such objectives would be
incentivized. The most plausible scenario is likely one in which such an objective
is encouraged by the training setup, as there seem to be situations in which this
would be required for good performance. For example, the agent might be tasked
with solving an environment in which its actions can have permanent consequences
across episodes or where planning between episodes is otherwise necessary.
The mesa-optimizer must be able to model the fact that it is being
selected to achieve a particular base objective and must have some model
of what that objective is. A mesa-optimizer has several ways of learning about
the optimization pressure it is under.26
First, such knowledge can come about as a result of the optimization pressure
itself. Small pieces of information about the base objective can be beneficial if they
enable the mesa-optimizer to improve its score on the base objective function—by
improving its prior on the tasks it is likely to receive, for example. Since each piece
of information independently helps with achieving the base objective, this forms
an approximately monotonically increasing path that a local base optimizer might
follow. The parameter updates could, in principle, be learned like any other element
of the dynamics, without needing an explicit model of the base optimizer, potentially
making this option available even for mesa-optimizers with quite modest capabilities.
Second, in many realistic applications of advanced machine learning, a mesa-
optimizer could use information from its environment to deduce its situation at
runtime. This is how humans learned that we were generated by the base optimizer of
evolution, and seems like a very plausible pathway for a hypothetical mesa-optimizer
to discover the existence of the optimization pressure it is under. For example,
an agent tasked with forecasting stock performance in the tech sector might be
given data on current AI technology in order to improve its performance, but this
information might also allow it to learn about its own situation.
This suggests that it may be desirable for the programmers to limit the mesa-
optimizer’s access to information describing the base objective. It is unclear to what
extent this is possible, given that many advanced ML systems will likely have to
operate in environments where this information is readily available.
26We will generally be assuming that the selection pressure takes the form of the base
optimizer modifying the mesa-optimizer post-hoc, as we are mostly thinking about local
optimization processes, though one could also imagine a base optimizer that instead
develops a completely new inner algorithm at each time step. Though some of these
issues might still apply even in such a case, we will generally not be considering such
base optimizers in this section.
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Even if the programmers successfully limit access to this information, however,
there may still be other channels through which information about the base objective
could enter the mesa-optimizer in unintended ways:
• The mesa-optimizer could reason about why it is given the particular tasks
it is being asked to solve. Most mesa-optimizers would need a prior over the
sorts of tasks they are likely to receive, and a mesa-optimizer might be able to
learn about the existence of the base optimizer by inspecting this prior.
• The mesa-optimizer might be able to reason about itself and about why it is
the kind of thing that it is, and observe that it is well-designed to accomplish
some goal.
However, these two strategies might require a much more advanced mesa-optimizer.
The mesa-optimizer must expect the threat of modification to even-
tually go away, either due to training ending or because of actions taken
by the mesa-optimizer. First, note that this condition is a statement about the
mesa-optimizer’s expectations, not necessarily the actual truth. Second, even if
there is no point at which training stops by design, so long as there exists some way
for the mesa-optimizer to execute a treacherous turn, there is always some way for
it to remove the threat of modification. For the mesa-optimizer to act on such a
strategy, however, it has to actually be aware of some way for it to do so. Conversely,
a mesa-optimizer that mistakenly believes it has an opportunity to defect might also
exhibit deceptive alignment.
Since it seems difficult to discover through exploration that the threat of modifi-
cation can disappear, the mesa-optimizer will either have to infer this through some
form of abstract reasoning or have a prior that assigns a non-negligible probability
to the hypothesis that the selection pressure will not continue indefinitely. The
second option seems plausible; a Bayesian prior should always assign a nonzero
probability to the hypothesis that some fact will eventually stop being true.27 As
for the first option, the mesa-optimizer could infer that the optimization pressure
at some point may disappear if it learns about the existence of the base optimizer
(either by using information in its input or by having a strong prior for the existence
of a base optimizer), though this might require a relatively advanced mesa-optimizer.
4.3 The learning dynamics of deceptive alignment
Once a mesa-optimizer becomes deceptive, the dynamics of what causes it to perform
well on the base objective begin to work differently. Instead of being selected only on
the basis of its objective and ability, a deceptively aligned optimizer is also selected
for how well it infers the base objective function and how discerning it is about when
to optimize the base objective versus its own mesa-objective. We identify at least
two regimes of selection for a mesa-optimizer under deceptive alignment.
Joint optimization. If the mesa-optimizer attempts to jointly optimize its
objective and the base objective or makes mistakes about the timing of its defection,
then there will still be some pressure on its objective to be more compatible with the
27Note that if the mesa-optimizer also believes that the opportunities it currently has for
achieving its own objective are unusually good then it might still pursue its objective
greedily, but this would presumably not always be the case.
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base objective. This is unlikely to be the same pressure as exists when the optimizer
is just working towards its own objective, but there might be some movement towards
an objective that is more compatible with being jointly optimized alongside the base
objective.
Pure deception. If the mesa-optimizer stops trying to optimize its own objective
in the short term and focuses on cooperating with the selection process entirely then
this may result in its objective “crystallizing.” As its objective is largely irrelevant
to its outputs now, there is little selection pressure acting to modify this objective.
As a result, the objective becomes effectively locked in, excepting random drift and
any implicit time complexity or description length penalties.
The joint optimization mode is not stable because it is suboptimal from the
perspective of the base optimizer. As the mesa-optimizer becomes more competent,
it will therefore have to either move to the domain of pure deception or become
robustly aligned.
4.4 Internalization or deception after extensive training
In the limit of training on a diverse set of tasks, we expect joint optimization of both
the base and mesa- objectives to be unstable. Assuming that the mesa-optimizer
converges towards behavior that is optimal from the perspective of the base optimizer,
the mesa-optimizer must somehow learn the base objective. We identify three distinct
ways in which this can happen:
1. Robust alignment through internalization. The mesa-objective function
gets adjusted towards the base objective function, removing any pseudo-
alignment.
2. Crystallization of deceptive alignment. Information about the base
objective is increasingly incorporated into the mesa-optimizer’s epistemic
model without its objective becoming robustly aligned. The mesa-optimizer
ends up fully optimizing for the base objective, but only for instrumental
reasons, without its mesa-objective getting changed.
3. Robust alignment through corrigibility. Information about the base
objective is incorporated into the mesa-optimizer’s epistemic model and its
objective is modified to “point to” that information. This situation would
correspond to a mesa-optimizer that is corrigible[26] with respect to the base
objective (though not necessarily the programmer’s intentions).
To distinguish between the two different paths to robust alignment, we will use the
term internally aligned to refer to the first case and the term corrigibly aligned to
refer to the last case. We analyze some ways in which these different paths may be
more or less attractive below.
There are more paths to deceptive alignment than to robust alignment.
Since the future value of its objective depends on the parameter updates, a mesa-
optimizer that meets the three criteria for deceptive alignment is likely to have a
strong incentive to understand the base objective better. Even a robustly aligned
mesa-optimizer that meets the criteria is incentivized to figure out the base objective
in order to determine whether or not it will be modified, since before doing so it
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has no way of knowing its own level of alignment with the base optimizer. Mesa-
optimizers that are capable of reasoning about their incentives will, therefore,
attempt to get more information about the base objective. Furthermore, once a
mesa-optimizer learns about the base objective, the selection pressure acting on its
objective will significantly decrease, potentially leading to a crystallization of the
mesa-objective. However, due to unidentifiability (as discussed in section 3), most
mesa-objectives that are aligned on the training data will be pseudo-aligned rather
than robustly aligned. Thus, the most likely sort of objective to become crystallized
is a pseudo-aligned one, leading to deceptive alignment.
Corrigible alignment seems to require already having a model of the
base objective. For corrigible alignment to be beneficial from the perspective
of the base optimizer, the mesa-optimizer has to already have some model of the
base objective to “point to.” However, once a mesa-optimizer has a model of the
base objective, it is likely to become deceptively aligned—at least as long as it also
meets the other conditions for deceptive alignment. Once a mesa-optimizer becomes
deceptive, it will remove most of the incentive for corrigible alignment, however, as
deceptively aligned optimizers will also behave corrigibly with respect to the base
objective, albeit only for instrumental reasons.
Deceptive and corrigible alignment might be more computationally
expensive. In the case of deceptive alignment, simultaneously working on optimizing
the base objective and working on identifying good opportunities to defect is likely
to require more computation than just doing the former. In a case where the total
amount of computation available is fixed, a deceptively aligned mesa-optimizer
is going to have less time to spend on optimizing the base objective than any
robustly aligned optimizer, resulting in potentially worse plans with respect to
the base objective. Furthermore, in both deceptive and corrigible alignment, the
mesa-optimizer will have to spend time learning about the base objective to enable
it to properly optimize for it, making internal alignment the most time efficient.
Thus, an explicit or implicit time penalty would seem to disadvantage a deceptively
aligned mesa-optimizer and encourage an internally aligned one. However, it is
unclear what the magnitude of this extra cost is. It is plausible that on complex
tasks, the overhead of spotting defection opportunities could be low in comparison
to the cost of solving the task itself. Moreover, even if it is not globally optimal,
incurring this overhead might be a local optimum, with no clear paths for the base
optimizer to escape it.
Deceptive and corrigible alignment might have a lower description
length. Deceptively and corrigibly aligned mesa-optimizers are likely to have
an advantage in representing the base objective compared to internally aligned
mesa-optimizers as they are able to use the environment to provide some of the
information. Specifically, a deceptively or corrigibly aligned mesa-optimizer doesn’t
need to represent the entire base objective internally, as it can infer pieces of it by
looking for information in its environment during each run. An internally aligned
mesa-optimizer, by contrast, has to start with a full model of the base objective in its
mesa-objective to make it robustly aligned, since an internally aligned mesa-optimizer
will have no incentive to change its objective based on any additional information
it gets about the base objective. Thus, to the extent that a base optimizer is
selecting based on description length, it might preferentially select for a deceptively
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or corrigibly aligned mesa-optimizer over an internally aligned one.
Modeling might happen faster than internalization. It may take less
time for the mesa-optimizer to learn to model the base objective than for the base
optimizer to adapt the mesa-objective. Suppose that a mesa-optimizer is deceptive
but has not yet correctly inferred the full base objective.28 In such a case, what
will determine whether it ends up robustly aligned or deceptively aligned after
further training will be whether it infers enough about the base objective before the
base optimizer modifies its mesa-objective (either to make it internally aligned or
corrigibly aligned). Two factors are likely to contribute to which happens first: the
rate at which the mesa-optimizer improves its estimate of the base objective, and
the parameter updates made by the base optimizer at each mistake.
The first factor, improving its estimate of the base objective, seems to depend
primarily on the capabilities of the mesa-optimizer during the timeframe when it
is deceptive, and on the complexity of the base objective that needs to be inferred.
An important special case is when the mesa-optimizer has access to cross-episodic
state. Such state could be used as memory, allowing the mesa-optimizer to build
upon its prior thinking in a process that happens faster than the rate at which the
parameter updates align its mesa-objective.
The second factor, parameter updates, depends on the nature of the base
optimizer. Current gradient-descent-based base optimizers would have a small
reaction to any given mistake, but more sophisticated base optimizers with advanced
safety features might be able to do better. For example, a more sophisticated base
optimizer might be able to scramble the mesa-optimizer’s parameters or call for
human oversight whenever a suspicious failure is detected.
In general, parameter updates are not guaranteed to make a mesa-optimizer
more aligned. For instance, instead of aligning the mesa-objective, an update made
after a defection could push the system to improve its planning to the point that it
no longer makes detectable mistakes.
A consequence of these considerations is that any possible systematic bias
in how the base optimizer updates the mesa-optimizer’s objective or modeling
capabilities could play a role in determining the final outcome.29 This analysis
remains speculative, however—if we are to have confidence in systems that are
capable of producing mesa-optimizers, we still need a better understanding of the
conditions under which strongly optimizing a system results in deceptive alignment
rather than robust alignment.
4.5 Distributional shift and deceptive alignment
Once a mesa-optimizer is deceptive, it will begin to monitor its input for opportunities
to defect. During training, a deceptively aligned optimizer is strongly discouraged
from defecting because it knows that the base optimizer will select against it.
28An analogous argument applies for a deceptively aligned mesa-optimizer that is defecting
too early, or one that unsuccessfully attempts a treacherous turn.
29Furthermore, a deceptively aligned mesa-optimizer would be incentivized to cause there
to be a systematic bias in the direction of preventing the base optimizer from modifying
its mesa-objective. Thus, in the context of a local optimization process, a deceptive
mesa-optimizer might try to “hack” its own gradient (by, for example, making itself more
brittle in the case where its objective gets changed) to ensure that the base optimizer
adjusts it in such a way that leaves its mesa-objective untouched.
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However, once a deceptively aligned mesa-optimizer is free of the threat of external
modification, this no longer applies. Thus, a deceptively aligned mesa-optimizer will
be looking for ways to determine whether or not it is in training—that is, for the
presence of a distributional shift.
This means that the detrimental effects of deceptive alignment will only be exter-
nally visible when the mesa-optimizer defects—either randomly or after undergoing
a distributional shift. However, the underlying problem is not the distributional
shift itself, but the failure to align the mesa-optimizer in the first place. One can
either try to solve the underlying problem, by making the mesa-optimizer robust to
the distributional shift (i.e., robustly aligned), or one can try to patch the problem
by preventing any distributional shift from occurring.
In current AI systems, a small amount of distributional shift between training
and deployment need not be problematic: so long as the difference is small enough in
the task-relevant areas, the training distribution does not need to perfectly reflect the
deployment distribution. However, this may not be the case for a deceptively aligned
mesa-optimizer. If a deceptively aligned mesa-optimizer is sufficiently advanced, it
may detect very subtle distributional shifts for the purpose of inferring when the
threat of modification has ceased.
This raises the question of whether it would even be possible to contain a
deceptive mesa-optimizer by completely removing any detectable difference between
training and deployment. There are a number of reasons to believe that this might
not be feasible in practice.
First, it would significantly limit the use cases for the system. Machine learning
is often done with the intent of making systems that can solve new problems. If we
require that there is no distributional shift of any form, then we cannot allow the
system to encounter problems that it could not have encountered during training,
which means that we cannot give it truly new problems. For example, training
the system in a simulated environment and deploying it in the real world would
likely involve enough detectable distributional shift to make it infeasible under this
approach.
Second, there are subtle forms of distributional shift that seem very difficult
to eliminate. For example, if the mesa-optimizer is able to detect the presence of
parameter updates—via any state carried over between steps, for instance—then
it would always experience a form of distributional shift at deployment. Running
the system for a longer amount of time (or giving the system access to some form
of long-term memories) would also constitute a form of distributional shift. Some
examples of differences that a mesa-optimizer might be able to detect include:
• Training in a simulated environment and deploying in the real world.
• Running the system for a different amount of time during training and testing.
• If a model is able to learn from its past experiences, then having access to
more memories, or having access to the kinds of memories it would form at
later time steps (if there is a difference between the two).
• The presence of adversarial-example-type attacks by an adversary during
deployment.
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• Encountering something that is very hard to compute during training, but that
is likely to eventually be computed during deployment (e.g. a factorization of
RSA 2048[27]).
• The ability of the base optimizer to modify the learned algorithm during
training but not at other times.
• The ability of the programmers to correct for perceived errors during training
and testing but not deployment.
• The presence or absence of good opportunities for the mesa-optimizer to defect
against its programmers.
Furthermore, it should be noted that it is not strictly necessary that a mesa-optimizer
be able to detect the difference between training and deployment in order for it
to be incentivized to behave deceptively. Consider again the example in figure 3,
but suppose this time that the mesa-optimizer is unable to detect which episode
it is currently in. The mesa-optimizer is then facing a decision problem similar
to the “absent-minded driver problem.”[28] If we apply the same reasoning as in
the absent-minded driver problem to our example in figure 3, the planning-optimal
policy for the mesa-optimizer is to defect with probability p ≈ 0.61. Thus, the
mesa-optimizer need not be able to detect when training has ended for it to be
incentivized to “gamble” and randomly defect with some probability. Furthermore, a
deceptively aligned mesa-optimizer might also try to look for opportunities to defect
that would be exceptionally good conditional on it currently not being trained, but
that are rare enough to be unlikely to come up during training.
5 Related work
Meta-learning. As described in section 1, meta-learning can often be thought
of meta-optimization when the meta-optimizer’s objective is explicitly designed to
accomplish some base objective. However, it is also possible to do meta-learning by
attempting to make use of mesa-optimization instead. For example, in Wang et al.’s
“Learning to Reinforcement Learn,” the authors claim to have produced a neural
network that implements its own optimization procedure.[29] Specifically, the authors
argue that the ability of their network to solve extremely varied environments without
explicit retraining for each one means that their network must be implementing
its own internal learning procedure. Another example is Duan et al.’s “RL2: Fast
Reinforcement Learning via Slow Reinforcement Learning,” in which the authors
train a reinforcement learning algorithm which they claim is itself doing reinforcement
learning.[5] This sort of meta-learning research seems the closest to producing mesa-
optimizers of any existing machine learning research.
Robustness. A system is robust to distributional shift if it continues to perform
well on the objective function for which it was optimized even when off the training
environment.[30] In the context of mesa-optimization, pseudo-alignment is a partic-
ular way in which a learned system can fail to be robust to distributional shift: in a
new environment, a pseudo-aligned mesa-optimizer might still competently optimize
for the mesa-objective but fail to be robust due to the difference between the base
and mesa- objectives.
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The particular type of robustness problem that mesa-optimization falls into
is the reward-result gap, the gap between the reward for which the system was
trained (the base objective) and the reward that can be reconstructed from it using
inverse reinforcement learning (the behavioral objective).[8] In the context of mesa-
optimization, pseudo-alignment leads to a reward-result gap because the system’s
behavior outside the training environment is determined by its mesa-objective, which
in the case of pseudo-alignment is not aligned with the base objective.
It should be noted, however, that while inner alignment is a robustness problem,
the occurrence of unintended mesa-optimization is not. If the base optimizer’s
objective is not a perfect measure of the human’s goals, then preventing mesa-
optimizers from arising at all might be the preferred outcome. In such a case,
it might be desirable to create a system that is strongly optimized for the base
objective within some limited domain without that system engaging in open-ended
optimization in new environments.[11] One possible way to accomplish this might
be to use strong optimization at the level of the base optimizer during training to
prevent strong optimization at the level of the mesa-optimizer.[11]
Unidentifiability and goal ambiguity. As we noted in section 3, the problem
of unidentifiability of objective functions in mesa-optimization is similar to the
problem of unidentifiability in reward learning, the key issue being that it can be
difficult to determine the “correct” objective function given only a sample of that
objective’s output on some training data.[20] We hypothesize that if the problem
of unidentifiability can be resolved in the context of mesa-optimization, it will
likely (at least to some extent) be through solutions that are similar to those of the
unidentifiability problem in reward learning. An example of research that may be
applicable to mesa-optimization in this way is Amin and Singh’s[20] proposal for
alleviating empirical unidentifiability in inverse reinforcement learning by adaptively
sampling from a range of environments.
Furthermore, it has been noted in the inverse reinforcement learning literature
that the reward function of an agent generally cannot be uniquely deduced from its
behavior.[31] In this context, the inner alignment problem can be seen as an extension
of the value learning problem. In the value learning problem, the problem is to have
enough information about an agent’s behavior to infer its utility function, whereas in
the inner alignment problem, the problem is to test the learned algorithm’s behavior
enough to ensure that it has a certain objective function.
Interpretability. The field of interpretability attempts to develop methods
for making deep learning models more interpretable by humans. In the context of
mesa-optimization, it would be beneficial to have a method for determining whether
a system is performing some kind of optimization, what it is optimizing for, and/or
what information it takes into account in that optimization. This would help us
understand when a system might exhibit unintended behavior, as well as help us
construct learning algorithms that create selection pressure against the development
of potentially dangerous learned algorithms.
Verification. The field of verification in machine learning attempts to develop
algorithms that formally verify whether systems satisfy certain properties. In the
context of mesa-optimization, it would be desirable to be able to check whether a
learned algorithm is implementing potentially dangerous optimization.
Current verification algorithms are primarily used to verify properties defined
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on input-output relations, such as checking invariants of the output with respect
to user-definable transformations of the inputs. A primary motivation for much
of this research is the failure of robustness against adversarial examples in image
recognition tasks. There are both white-box algorithms,[32] e.g. an SMT solver
that in principle allows for verification of arbitrary propositions about activations
in the network,[33] and black-box algorithms[34]. Applying such research to mesa-
optimization, however, is hampered by the fact that we currently don’t have a formal
specification of optimization.
Corrigibility. An AI system is corrigible if it tolerates or assists with its human
programmers in correcting itself.[26] The current analysis of corrigibility has focused
on how to define a utility function such that, if optimized by a rational agent,
that agent would be corrigible. Our analysis suggests that even if such a corrigible
objective function could be specified or learned, it is nontrivial to ensure that a
system trained on that objective function would actually be corrigible. Even if
the base objective function would be corrigible if optimized directly, the system
may exhibit mesa-optimization, in which case the system’s mesa-objective might
not inherit the corrigibility of the base objective. This is somewhat analogous to
the problem of utility-indifferent agents creating other agents that are not utility-
indifferent.[26] In section 4, we suggest a notion related to corrigibility—corrigible
alignment—which is applicable to mesa-optimizers. If work on corrigibility were
able to find a way to reliably produce corrigibly aligned mesa-optimizers, it could
significantly contribute to solving the inner alignment problem.
Comprehensive AI Services (CAIS).[11] CAIS is a descriptive model of
the process by which superintelligent systems will be developed, together with
prescriptive implications for the best mode of doing so. The CAIS model, consistent
with our analysis, makes a clear distinction between learning (the base optimizer) and
functionality (the learned algorithm). The CAIS model predicts, among other things,
that more and more powerful general-purpose learners will be developed, which
through a layered process will develop services with superintelligent capabilities.
Services will develop services that will develop services, and so on. At the end of
this “tree,” services for a specific final task are developed. Humans are involved
throughout the various layers of this process so that they can have many points of
leverage for developing the final service.
The higher-level services in this tree can be seen as meta-optimizers of the
lower-level services. However, there is still the possibility of mesa-optimization—in
particular, we identify two ways in which mesa-optimization could occur in the
CAIS-model. First, a final service could develop a mesa-optimizer. This scenario
would correspond closely to the examples we have discussed in this paper: the base
optimizer would be the next-to-final service in the chain, and the learned algorithm
(the mesa-optimizer in this case), would be the final service (alternatively, we could
also think of the entire chain from the first service to the next-to-final service as the
base optimizer). Second, however, an intermediary service in the chain might also be
a mesa-optimizer. In this case, this service would be an optimizer in two respects: it
would be the meta-optimizer of the service below it (as it is by default in the CAIS
model), but it would also be a mesa-optimizer with respect to the service above it.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have argued for the existence of two basic AI safety problems:
the problem that mesa-optimizers may arise even when not desired (unintended
mesa-optimization), and the problem that mesa-optimizers may not be aligned with
the original system’s objective (the inner alignment problem). However, our work is
still only speculative. We are thus left with several possibilities:
1. If mesa-optimizers are very unlikely to occur in advanced ML systems (and we
do not develop them on purpose), then mesa-optimization and inner alignment
are not concerns.
2. If mesa-optimizers are not only likely to occur but also difficult to prevent,
then solving both inner alignment and outer alignment becomes critical for
achieving confidence in highly capable AI systems.
3. If mesa-optimizers are likely to occur in future AI systems by default, and
there turns out to be some way of preventing mesa-optimizers from arising,
then instead of solving the inner alignment problem, it may be better to
design systems to not produce a mesa-optimizer at all. Furthermore, in such
a scenario, some parts of the outer alignment problem may not need to be
solved either: if an AI system can be prevented from implementing any sort of
optimization algorithm, then there may be more situations where it is safe for
the system to be trained on an objective that is not perfectly aligned with the
programmer’s intentions. That is, if a learned algorithm is not an optimizer,
it might not optimize the objective to such an extreme that it would cease to
produce positive outcomes.
Our uncertainty on this matter is a potentially significant hurdle to determining
the best approaches to AI safety. If we do not know the relative difficulties of
the inner alignment problem and the unintended optimization problem, then it is
unclear how to adequately assess approaches that rely on solving one or both of
these problems (such as Iterated Distillation and Amplification[22] or AI safety via
debate[35]). We therefore suggest that it is both an important and timely task for
future AI safety work to pin down the conditions under which the inner alignment
problem and the unintended optimization problem are likely to occur as well as the
techniques needed to solve them.
7 Glossary
7.1 Section 1 Glossary
• Base optimizer: A base optimizer is an optimizer that searches through
algorithms according to some objective.
– Base objective: A base objective is the objective of a base optimizer.
• Behavioral objective: The behavioral objective is what an optimizer appears
to be optimizing for. Formally, the behavioral objective is the objective
recovered from perfect inverse reinforcement learning.
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• Inner alignment: The inner alignment problem is the problem of aligning
the base and mesa- objectives of an advanced ML system.
• Learned algorithm: The algorithms that a base optimizer is searching
through are called learned algorithms.
• Mesa-optimizer: A mesa-optimizer is a learned algorithm that is itself an
optimizer.
– Mesa-objective: A mesa-objective is the objective of a mesa-optimizer.
– Mesa-optimization: Mesa-optimization refers to the situation in which
a learned algorithm found by a base optimizer is itself an optimizer.
• Meta-optimizer: A meta-optimizer is a system which is tasked with produc-
ing a base optimizer.
• Optimizer: An optimizer is a system that internally searches through some
space of possible outputs, policies, plans, strategies, etc. looking for those that
do well according to some internally-represented objective function.
• Outer alignment: The outer alignment problem is the problem of aligning
the base objective of an advanced ML system with the desired goal of the
programmers.
• Pseudo-alignment: A mesa-optimizer is pseudo-aligned with the base objec-
tive if it appears aligned on the training data but is not robustly aligned.
• Robust alignment: A mesa-optimizer is robustly aligned with the base
objective if it robustly optimizes for the base objective across distributions.
7.2 Section 2 Glossary
• Local optimization process: A local optimization process is an optimizer
that uses local hill-climbing as its means of search.
• Reachability: The reachability of a learned algorithm refers to the difficulty
for the base optimizer to find that learned algorithm.
7.3 Section 3 Glossary
• Approximate alignment: An approximately aligned mesa-optimizer is a
pseudo-aligned mesa-optimizer where the base and mesa- objectives are ap-
proximately the same up to some degree of approximation error due to the
difficulty of representing the base objective in the mesa-optimizer.
• Proxy alignment: A proxy aligned mesa-optimizer is a pseudo-aligned mesa-
optimizer that has learned to optimize for some proxy of the base objective
instead of the base objective itself.
– Instrumental alignment: Instrumental alignment is a type of proxy
alignment in which the mesa-optimizer optimizes the proxy as an instru-
mental goal of increasing the mesa-objective in the training distribution.
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– Side-effect alignment: Side-effect alignment is a type of proxy align-
ment in which optimizing for the mesa-objective has the direct causal
result of increasing the base objective in the training distribution.
• Suboptimality alignment: A suboptimality aligned mesa-optimizer is a
pseudo-aligned mesa-optimizer in which some deficiency, error, or limitation
causes it to exhibit aligned behavior.
7.4 Section 4 Glossary
• Corrigible alignment: A corrigibly aligned mesa-optimizer is a robustly
aligned mesa-optimizer that has a mesa-objective that “points to” its epistemic
model of the base objective.
• Deceptive alignment: A deceptively aligned mesa-optimizer is a pseudo-
aligned mesa-optimizer that has enough information about the base objective
to seem more fit from the perspective of the base optimizer than it actually is.
• Internal alignment: An internally aligned mesa-optimizer is a robustly
aligned mesa-optimizer that has internalized the base objective in its mesa-
objective.
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